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 Abstract 
 Among the protest movements sweeping the region in the Arab awakening of 2011, the Egyptian 
revolt is the movement that is perhaps most deﬁ ned by a struggle over the Constitution and the 
rule of law more generally.  I argue that this intense focus on law and legal institutions is a legacy 
of the prominent role that law played in maintaining authoritarian rule in Mubarak’s Egypt.  Just 
as law and legal institutions were the principal mechanisms undergirding authoritarian rule, 
opposition activists know that democracy can only emerge through comprehensive legal reform. 
Th is article examines the struggle for constitutional power in three periods – before, during, and 
after the Egyptian revolt of 2011. 
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 Beginning on January 25, 2011, Egyptians went to the streets in the millions 
to claim their rights. After 18 days of popular mobilization, Husni Mubarak’s 
three decades in power were brought to an abrupt end. What was notable 
about this popular revolt was not simply the fact that the Egyptian public 
overcame the formidable defenses of a deeply entrenched regime, but also the 
character of this popular mobilization—namely, the extent to which law and 
legal institutions were, and still remain, on the front lines of political struggle. 
From day one of the protests, a new Constitution was front and centre in 
political debates, not simply among political elites, but also among “everyday 
Egyptians.” A new Constitution that would protect political rights and 
freedoms was one of the primary demands in the early days of the revolt, and 
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it remains a central objective of political activists months after Mubarak’s 
departure. 
 Th is focus on law and legal institutions was no doubt motivated by the 
myriad abuses that Egyptians had suﬀ ered. Widespread corruption, police 
brutality, and an unaccountable government were all highlighted by the “We 
are all Khaled Said” Facebook page that inspired the “day of rage” on January 
25, 2011. But the focus on the Constitution was also in response to the spe-
ciﬁ c mechanisms of social and political control that the Mubarak regime had 
skillfully wielded for three decades. Mubarak’s was a “rule-by-law” regime. 
It had maintained its power not simply through brute force, but through a 
complex array of laws and legal institutions that were deployed to dominate 
every aspect of political and social life, from labor unions, to professional syn-
dicates, to the press, to university campuses, to religious institutions, to politi-
cal parties and civil society groups. Egyptians have a sober understanding of 
the centrality of law and legal institutions to both dictatorship and democracy, 
which is why legal reform remains at the forefront of political struggle months 
after Mubarak’s departure. Egyptians wish to transform the January 25 move-
ment beyond a successful revolt against Mubarak and his cronies to a true 
revolution: one that changes not just regime personalities, but also the institu-
tions of governance; one in which rule-by-law institutions, still largely intact, 
are replaced with rule-of-law institutions; and one in which political institu-
tions channel rather than thwart popular participation. At the time of writing 
in late June 2011, it is still too early to know the trajectory that the Egyptian 
political system is likely to take with any degree of conﬁ dence. But we have 
enough distance at this point to take stock of the early days of political trans-
formation, the prominent role of law in the Egyptian revolt, and the legal 
conundrums that loom on the horizon. 
 Rule by Law in Mubarak’s Egypt 
 Th e Constitution that was in force in the Mubarak years dates back to 1971, 
when the previous president, Anwar Sadat, moved to create a base of political 
legitimacy around the principal of  sayadat al-qanun (the rule of law). Th e 
national referendum on the 1971 Constitution supposedly received support 
from 99.98 percent of the Egyptian public, but the gulf between the regime’s 
rule-of-law rhetoric and the reality of electoral manipulation was not lost 
on Egyptians. Still, the 1971 Constitution contained a surprising number of 
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liberal elements. Th ese included protections on the freedom of speech (article 
47), freedom of the press (article 48), freedom of assembly (article 54), and 
freedom of association (article 55), among others. Th e Constitution was also 
clear on the independence of the judiciary (articles 65 and 165), the indepen-
dence of judges (article 166), and the division of powers between the executive 
and the legislative branches. Th e state was subject to the law (article 65), and 
citizens were guaranteed access to their rights in a court of law (article 68). 
 However, these liberal aspects of the 1971 Constitution were hemmed in by 
illiberal provisions, including article 88 (which governed the supervision of 
elections), article 93 (which prevented the courts from invalidating member-
ship to the People’s Assembly as a result of election irregularities), article 179 
(which provided broad powers to a Socialist Public Prosecutor), and articles 
112, 113, 136, 167, and 171 (which collectively weakened the People’s 
Assembly and the judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive Authority). Additionally, an 
extensive web of illiberal legislation governing all aspects of political and social 
life eﬀ ectively hollowed out the liberal provisions that were enshrined in the 
Constitution. Finally, the emergency law (in continuous force through 
Mubarak’s rule), state security courts, and military courts further contained 
opposition. Although a variety of extralegal tactics were used from time to 
time, “rule by law” institutions were the principal means by which the 
Mubarak regime maintained its grip on power. 
 Given this constitutional framework, it is somewhat paradoxical that the 
law and legal institutions became the primary avenue through which opposi-
tion activists challenged the regime within the formal political system of the 
Mubarak years. Liberal aspects of the Constitution gave activists openings to 
challenge the executive in Egypt’s semi-autonomous courts. 2 When all other 
avenues of political activism were closed, it was the courts to which human 
rights lawyers, opposition parties, leftists, liberals, Islamists, and everyday citi-
zens ﬂ ocked to challenge the state. Citizens frequently prevailed, at least when 
the stakes were low. But even in politically charged cases, activists occasionally 
scored major victories against the state. Th roughout the 1990s and into the 
ﬁ rst decade of the new millennium, human rights organizations, opposition 
parties, and political activists of all stripes engaged in litigation as the most 
 2) For more on why the regime allowed for the emergence of semi-autonomous courts, see Tamir 
Moustafa,  Th e Struggle for Constitutional Power: Law, Politics, and Economic Development in Egypt 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Tamir Moustafa, “Law versus the State: Th e 
Judicialization of Politics in Egypt,”  Law and Social Inquiry 28 (2003): 883-930. 
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viable avenue to challenge the executive. 3 Rights activists even launched cases 
that they knew they could  not win as a way of drawing attention to the yawn-
ing gap between Mubarak’s reformist discourse and the realities of authoritar-
ian rule. All the while, court cases provided copious fodder for opposition 
newspapers to focus public attention on the ways in which the law constrained 
political life. 
 While rights activists worked to exploit openings in the formal legal system, 
the regime constantly spun out fresh, illiberal legislation. Th e regime also 
undermined the independence of the Supreme Constitutional Court—the 
most important institution through which rights groups had mobilized. 4 
Finally, the regime pushed through controversial amendments to the Consti-
tution in 2005 and 2007 that entrenched illiberal measures into the Con -
stitution itself, thus placing them beyond the scope of judicial review. 5 An 
amendment to article 88 substantially weakened the role of judges in oversee-
ing elections, a roll that they had assumed as the result of a landmark Supreme 
Constitutional Court ruling in 2000. Article 179 was also substantially 
amended in 2007, essentially building aspects of the emergency law straight 
into the Constitution. 6 An amendment to article 5 similarly entrenched the 
ban on parties with a religious orientation and ﬁ nally, strict rules for candi-
dacy in an amended article 76 made it virtually impossible to have meaningful 
presidential elections. In eﬀ ect, the law was used to construct a facade of open 
political contestation, with little threat of any meaningful challenge to the 
regime. 
 Th ere was, of course, resistance to executive retrenchment. Street protest 
had returned to Egypt beginning in 2003. 7 Yet, although the opposition group 
 kifaya! (enough!) had played a critical role in breaking the veil of silence, street 
protests never gathered more than a few thousand participants. 8 One of the 
 3) Moustafa,  Th e Struggle for Constitutional Power , 118-277. 
 4) Th ese developments are covered in Moustafa,  Th e Struggle for Constitutional Power , 178-218. 
 5) For a more detailed analysis of these amendments, see Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron, “Th e 
2007 Constitutional Amendments in Egypt, and Th eir Implications on the Balance of Power,” 
 Arab Law Quarterly 22 (2008): 397-417. 
 6) Article 179 explicitly states that articles 41, 44, and 45 of the Constitution,  guaranteeing funda-
mental liberties and protecting citizens from search without warrant, “shall in no way preclude 
such counter-terror action.” With terms such as “public security” and “counter-terror” loosely 
deﬁ ned, article 179 provided the regime with extensive tools to punish regime opponents. 
 7) Tamir Moustafa, “Protests Hint at New Chapter in Egyptian Politics,”  Middle East Report 
Online , 9 April 2004,  http://www.merip.org/mero/mero040904 accessed 30 June, 2011. 
 8)  Kifaya! is the moniker for  al-Haraka al-Masriyya min agl al-Taghyeer (Th e Egyptian Movement 
for Change). 
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most striking cycles of protest in 2006 and 2007 focused public attention on 
demands for an independent judiciary, and later, opposition to the 2007 con-
stitutional amendments. Rights consciousness was on the rise, but political 
activists were constrained by the heavy security presence and their inability to 
draw more protesters into action. 
 Resistance to the regime broadened signiﬁ cantly, however, as the result of suc-
cessful labor actions from 2004 to 2010. Th e 22,000-strong textile worker 
strikes in Mahalla al-Kubra in 2006 and 2007 were among the dozens that 
were closely watched by the rest of the nation. 9 A year later, strikes in Mahalla 
showcased the emerging links between workers and urban-based political 
activists in the 6 th of April Youth Movement. Rights advocates who had been 
working for years in small circles were ﬁ nally forging organic links to mass 
publics. Wildcat strikes became high proﬁ le aﬀ airs, and more often than not 
workers gained concessions. In the process, they spurred others to assert their 
own rights claims. 10 Th e deteriorating economic situation for the bulk of 
Egyptian society coupled with the vast sums of wealth being amassed by crony 
capitalists fed widespread discontent. 11 At the same time, the November 2010 
People’s Assembly election underlined the regime’s determination to silence 
opposition in advance of an anticipated eﬀ ort to install Gamal Mubarak in 
upcoming presidential elections. 12 Th e time was ripe for political change in 
Egypt, but it was the breathtaking example of the 2011 Tunisian revolt that 
truly inspired people power. 
 Claiming Rights in the Egyptian Revolt 
 Within days of popular mobilization beginning on January 25 th , momentum 
had already shifted from the government to the protesters. 13 For the ﬁ rst time 
  9) Joel Beinin, “Th e Militancy of Mahalla al-Kubra,”  Middle East Report Online , 29 September 
2007,  http://www.merip.org/mero/mero092907 accessed 30 June, 2011. 
 10) Th e strike among 55,000 state tax collectors, for example, created a public spectacle when 
thousands camped outside of the People’s Assembly in 2007. Th ey won their demands with a 
325 percent increase in salary. 
 11) Th e rapid rise in the cost of food on the international market fueled discontent among the 
middle class, and among the 40 percent of Egyptians living on two dollars or less per day. 
 12) Opposition parties and the Muslim Brotherhood held 95 seats in the outgoing People’s 
Assembly of 2005-2010, whereas the 2010 elections delivered only 16 for opposition trends. 
 13) For a detailed account of the ﬁ rst days of protest, see Mona El-Ghobashy, “Th e Praxis of the 
Egyptian Revolution,”  Middle East Report 258 (Spring 2011). 
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in three decades, state security forces were on the defensive, and the regime 
was ﬁ ghting for political survival. Egyptians mobilized to claim their rights in 
an unprecedented manner, and a new, revolutionary political culture emerged 
virtually overnight. Workers went on strike across the country, including 
public transit employees, postal workers, state telecom employees, sanitation 
workers, employees of the electrical authority, textile workers, steel and other 
industrial workers. All called for higher wages, the immediate resignation of 
Mubarak, and – conspicuously – a new Constitution. 
 Faced with this unprecedented challenge, President Mubarak assured 
Egyptians that he would initiate constitutional reforms and not seek another 
term in oﬃ  ce. His freshly appointed vice-president, Omar Suleiman, detailed 
the promised legal and constitutional changes on February 6. What was strik-
ing about the announcement was that 10 of the 14 concessions detailed by 
Suleiman related to the Constitution or other legal reforms. Th e centrality of 
the law to the Egyptian revolt was clear, both among protesters who called for 
a new Constitution, and from the regime, which deployed law reform talk in 
a hollow eﬀ ort to appease protester demands. 
 Mubarak attempted to give credibility to his stated concessions when he 
formed a committee to amend the Constitution on February 8. Th e commit-
tee included independent legal personalities and outspoken reformist judges, 
such as Ahmed Mekki—who himself had faced disciplinary actions for his 
outspoken criticism of legal manipulation in the 2005 elections. Th e commit-
tee was charged with rolling back some of the illiberal constitutional amend-
ments adopted in 2007. But with momentum on their side, protesters were in 
no mood to engage in stick-and-carrot delay tactics. Faced with relentless 
popular pressure, Vice-President Suleiman announced Mubarak’s resignation 
on February 11, and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) 
assumed political control two days later. Pledging that they would stay in 
power for only six months, SCAF dissolved the People’s Assembly and sus-
pended the Constitution, ushering in the ﬁ rst period of direct military rule in 
decades. 
 Popular mobilization continued for months after Mubarak’s resignation 
with pressure focused on all sites of political authority: former NDP oﬃ  cials 
and regime cronies faced prosecution as a result of public pressure; students at 
Cairo University rallied to eject administrators who were appointed by 
Mubarak; labor unions and professional syndicates struggled to cast oﬀ  the 
heavy hand of the Egyptian corporatist state; students and faculty at al-Azhar 
rallied for institutional independence and elections for the oﬃ  ce of  sheikh 
al-Azhar ; and the state media and press similarly faced internal revolts against 
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Mubarak appointees. A tremendous cultural shift was underway as Egyptians 
felt a real sense of empowerment for the ﬁ rst time after decades of demobiliza-
tion. What was particularly notable was not just that popular rage was ﬁ nally 
being expressed, but that pressure was mobilized to force the legal reforms 
upon the illiberal institutions that had served the regime. As the most funda-
mental document outlining political institutions, the debate over the shape of 
a new Constitution immediately took centre stage. 
 Constitutional Conundrums and an Uncertain Future 
 Within days of assuming power, SCAF appointed a new committee to draft 
amendments to the Constitution. Many in the pro-democracy movement 
criticized its composition, scope, and timeline. Th e eight-member committee 
was headed by Tariq al-Bishri, a towering intellectual ﬁ gure and prominent 
jurist known for his outspoken criticism of the regime. Yet the rest of the 
committee was far less notable. Most signiﬁ cantly, the military excluded rep-
resentation from the groups that organized the January 25th democracy 
movement—indeed from almost all political parties and trends (save one 
member from the Muslim Brotherhood)—and not a single woman sat on the 
committee. Beyond the committee’s composition, pro-democracy activists 
were concerned that piecemeal changes in the form of constitutional amend-
ments would be insuﬃ  cient to engineer a fundamental reordering of the 
political system. 14 Finally, the work of the committee was closed, with no 
transparency or public accountability, and its timeline was swift. SCAF 
instructed the committee to prepare its recommendations within 10 days in 
preparation for a national referendum within two months, followed by presi-
dential and People’s Assembly elections within six months. 
 Th e constitutional reform committee unveiled its work after 10 days of 
deliberation. 15 Th e proposed amendments were to relax the tight restrictions 
for candidacy in presidential elections (article 76), restore full judicial supervi-
sion of elections (article 88), grant courts the power to decide on the validity 
 14) For example, see the statement by prominent Egyptian rights advocate, Bahieddin Hassan, 
“No to Neo-Mubarakism,”  al-Ahram Weekly , 17-23 February 2011. 
 15) For more detail on each of the proposed amendments, see Tamir Moustafa, “It’s not a 
Revolution yet”  Foreign Policy , 28 February 2011,  http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/
02/28/it_s_not_a_revolution_yet accessed 30 June, 2011. 
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of membership in the People’s Assembly (article 93), require the president to 
appoint a vice-president within two months of coming to power (article 139), 
require a public referendum if a state of emergency is to last more than 
six months (article 148), and cancel article 179, which had entrenched aspects 
of the emergency law into the Constitution itself. Finally, the package of 
amendments opened an avenue for a 100-member Constituent Assembly to 
draft an entirely new Constitution after the presidential and People’s Assembly 
elections. Given that other illiberal articles in the Constitution were not 
addressed, and the fact that a tremendous volume of illiberal enabling legisla-
tion remained on the books governing elections, party formation, the press, et 
cetera, the proposed constitutional amendments did not by themselves consti-
tute a deﬁ nitive break from the past. However, they did provide what were 
arguably the minimum steps necessary to initiate a viable program of political 
reform. 
 As the public took stock of the proposed amendments, two opposing views 
emerged. Th ose supporting the proposed amendments argued that their adop-
tion was the best way to ensure a smooth transition to democracy, and a quick 
exit for the military from political life. Th e Muslim Brotherhood came to 
endorse this position, as did many Egyptians from all walks of life who were 
growing increasingly alarmed by the deterioration in public security. But oth-
ers ﬁ ercely opposed the constitutional amendments on the ground that they 
did not provide a conclusive break from the past. Even with the amendments, 
they argued, the executive branch would wield signiﬁ cant powers. With politi-
cal institutions largely unchanged, they worried that it would only be a matter 
of time before remnants of the old regime, or some other illiberal political 
force, would assert control. Opponents of the amendments also worried that 
the swift timeline would not aﬀ ord nascent political groups suﬃ  cient time to 
organize and successfully contest presidential and parliamentary elections. 
A wide number of political actors urged a “no” vote in the referendum, includ-
ing most civil society groups, formal opposition parties, youth groups, and 
prom inent presidential hopefuls such as Mohamed el-Baradie and ‘Amr 
Mousa. 16 Perhaps more striking was the outspoken criticism that came from 
Tehani al-Gebali, a sitting justice on the Supreme Constitutional Court, 
the body that would adjudicate future constitutional challenges. Critics of 
 16) See, for example, the detailed press release from the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, 
issued March 7, 2011, “CIHRS urges the Supreme Military Council to reconsider the proposed 
amendments prior to referendum.”  http://www.cihrs.org/English/NewsSystem/Articles/2799
.aspx accessed 30 June, 2011. 
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the amendments urged a full-blown constitutional convention in advance of 
presidential and parliamentary elections. Th e heated debate over the con-
stitutional amendments subsided for a brief moment on the day of the refer-
endum, when all Egyptians celebrated the ﬁ rst vote of the post-Mubarak 
era, which by most accounts was the cleanest day at the ballot box in over half 
a century. On March 19, 2011, the referendum passed with 77 percent 
support. 
 On March 30, however, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued 
its constitutional declaration, a document with 63 articles that will serve as an 
interim Constitution until presidential and parliamentary elections are held, 
and a complete redrafting of the Constitution can begin. 17 Th e introduction 
of the constitutional declaration was a confusing development for all parties 
involved. Not only did the interim document displace the just-completed 
constitutional referendum, but it also reopened questions and debates about 
the sequencing of elections and a new Constitution. April, May, and June of 
2011 was a period of increasing confusion and anxiety. Unfortunately, the 
renewed debate once again mapped onto political cleavages, with the Muslim 
Brotherhood and other Islamist groups wishing to stick with elections ﬁ rst, 
and leftists and liberals pushing hard for a new Constitution in advance of 
elections. As of late June, a coalition of leftist and liberal forces initiated a 
“Constitution First” campaign, which aims to gather 15 million signatures 
urging SCAF to sequence the drafting of a new Constitution in advance of 
People’s Assembly and presidential elections. 
 Th e increasingly bitter debate has at least three important implications for 
the prospects of democracy and the rule of law. Th e ﬁ rst and most obvious 
problem is that the sense of unity and common purpose among opposition 
forces has come under signiﬁ cant strain. Th ere is no doubt that the revolt 
against Mubarak and the piecemeal concessions extracted from SCAF thus far 
were won only as the result of collective action across the various opposition 
trends. If political forces are unable to overcome their emerging diﬀ erences, it 
is unlikely that their many common objectives will materialize. Already, SCAF 
has shown dubious commitment to democracy and the rule of law. Since 
assuming power in what was essentially a coup d’état, SCAF has shown little 
 17) For more detail on the constitutional declaration, see Nathan Brown and Kristen Stilt, 
“A Haphazard Constitutional Compromise,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
Commentary, 25 June 2011,  http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2011/04/11/haphazard
-constitutional-compromise/3hi accessed 30 June, 2011. 
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regard for civil liberties and human rights. In their ﬁ rst two and a half months 
in power, for example, 5,600 civilians were sentenced in military courts, with 
another 1,300 trials in process in the military courts. 18 Without ﬁ rm and uni-
ﬁ ed pressure from social forces, a successful transition to democracy and the 
rule of law is far from guaranteed. 
 A second problem with the increasing rancor over the sequencing of elec-
tions and constitution drafting is that the question of timing is intimately 
wrapped up in one of the most vexing questions that Egypt faces: the place of 
religion in the Constitution. Much of the debate over sequencing relates to the 
fate of article 2 of the 1971 Constitution, which declares “Islamic jurispru-
dence is the principal source of legislation” ( mabadi’ al-shari‘a al-Islamiya 
al-masdar al-r’isi li al-tashri‘ ). Th is article, cynically adopted by Anwar Sadat 
to counter leftists, and later amended to co-opt an emergent Islamist move-
ment, was meant to bolster the regime’s religious credentials. Decades after its 
adoption, popular discussion of what this article should mean in practice, its 
compatibility with a civil state, and the implications for individual, minority 
and women’s rights are at last open for debate. Islamists are suspicious that 
leftists and liberals want to do away with article 2. Most leftists and liberals, 
on the other hand, while not necessarily opposed to article 2 in the abstract, 
are apprehensive about its implications in practice—particularly if the Muslim 
Brotherhood forms a government. Th e question of the sequencing of elec-
tions and a new Constitution only magniﬁ es the perceived stakes of this very 
polarizing issue. 
 A ﬁ nal problem with these debates is that they threaten to overshadow a 
much more signiﬁ cant issue for the bulk of Egyptians: how to generate eco-
nomic growth and redress the tremendous economic disparities in contempo-
rary Egypt. Economic issues are core for most Egyptians. Th ey are, moreover, 
intimately linked to the prospects for successful transition to democracy and 
the rule of law. Strikes played a critical role in elevating rights consciousness 
and shaping the political context in Egypt well in advance of the 2011 revolt. 
And, as in Tunisia, labor unions played an important role in helping topple 
the regime once protesters took to the streets. Moving to the future, the emer-
gence of independent trade unions is again vital not only to advance the rights 
 18) Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Military Trials Usurp Justice System,” 29 April 2011, 
 http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/04/29/egypt-military-trials-usurp-justice-system accessed 
30 June, 2011; and Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Human Rights Reform an Urgent Priority,” 
7 June 2011,  http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/06/07/egypt-human-rights-reform-urgent
-priority accessed 30 June, 2011. 
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claims of Egyptian workers, but also to push further institutional reform and 
to resist authoritarian retrenchment. Just as law and legal institutions were 
used by the Mubarak regime as the principal mechanisms to maintain power, 
democracy and accountable government can only emerge through the reform 
of those rule-by-law institutions. 
